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LOAD-SHARING DEPENDENCE MODELS AND CONSTRUCTION
OF VOTING SITUATIONS FOR ANY ARBITRARY RANKING
SCHEMES
EMILIO DE SANTIS AND FABIO SPIZZICHINO
Abstract. In this paper we present a study about minima among random variables,
about the context of voting theory, and about paradoxes related with such topics. In the
field of reliability theory, the term load-sharing model is commonly used to designate
a special type of multivariate survival models. We demonstrate the effectiveness that
such dependence models can have also in some other fields, such as those of interest
here. Several important, and by now classic, papers have been devoted to single out
and to prove general conclusions in the field of voting theory. We reformulate and
achieve such conclusions by developing a method of proof, alternative to the existing
ones, and completely probabilistic in nature. As main features of this method, we focus
attention on ranking schemes associated to m-tuples of non-negative random variables
and suitably single out a special subclass of load-sharing models. Then we show that
all possible ranking schemes can be conveniently obtained by only considering such
a special family of survival models. This result leads to some new insight about the
construction of voting situations which give rise to all possible types of voting paradoxes.
Our method and related implications will be also illustrated by means of some examples
and informative remarks.
Keywords: Minima among random variables, Voting theory, Aggregation paradoxes,
Condorcet paradox, Voting situations, Preference patterns, Ranking schemes, Time-
Homogeneous Load-Sharing models, Reallocation-symmetry in hazards property.
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1. Introduction
In the field of reliability theory, the term load-sharing model is mostly used to designate
a special type of multivariate survival models. The latter is described by a simplifying
condition of stochastic dependence among lifetimes of units which work simultaneously
in a same environment and which are supposed to support one another.
In this paper we demonstrate the effectiveness that such dependence models have also
in some other fields different from reliability and even far from probabilistic analysis
of lifetimes. Actually, we deal with a study about minima among random variables,
about the context of voting theory, and about paradoxes related with such topics. Some
results of conceptual interest will be obtained, concerning both voting theory and topics
of applied probability.
Let X1, . . . , Xm be m non-negative random variables defined on a same probability
space and satisfying the no-tie condition P (X1 6= . . . 6= Xm) = 1. For any subset A of the
set of indexes {1, . . . , m}, furthermore, and for any j ∈ A, let αj(A) be the probability
that Xj takes on the minimum value among all the other variables Xi with i ∈ A.
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When A exactly contains two elements, A := {i1, i2} say, the inequality αi1(A) ≥
1
2
translates the condition that Xi1 stochastically precedes Xi2 . But one can also be
interested in detecting the indexes, say jˆ(A), which maximize αj(A) for sets A containing
more than two elements.
Concerning the analysis of properties of the set of values jˆ(A), two different types of
paradoxes have been studied in the literature:
i. the non-transitivity property of stochastic precedence between random variables.
ii. aggregation paradoxes which can be related to the behavior of αj(A) and ˆ(A),
for sets A with cardinality |A| > 2.
Already at a first glance, such phenomena respectively reveal to be parallel to non-
transitivity of collective preferences within pairs of candidates and to voting-related
aggregation paradoxes. Classical references can be given where these topics have been
treated, also under different types of languages and notation. See e.g. [3], [21], [28],
[29], [3], for item i. and [2], [18] for item ii; see also [6]. Non-transitivity of stochastic
precedence amounts to the fact that for the variables X1, . . . , Xm and for three indexes
j, i, h one can simultaneously have
αj ({i, j}) >
1
2
, αi ({i, h}) >
1
2
, αh ({h, j}) >
1
2
.
We remind that, in the frame of voting theory, similar aspects of non-transitivity are
shown by the Condorcet’s paradox. Consider three candidates c1, c2, c3 who participate
in elections where the winner is determined according to a majority rule. The paradox
demonstrates that, at the collective level of all the voters, c1 may be preferred to c2 even
if c2 is preferred to c3 and c3 is preferred to c1. As well-know, a very rich literature
has been devoted to this specific topic (see in particular [15], [9], [1], [16]) and, more
generally, to the field of paradoxes related with voting theory.
Very briefly, we just remind the following voting context created by a set of m indi-
viduals, who all are admissible candidates in different elections, and a family of n voters.
The individual preferences of single voters are complete, transitive, and are such that
indifference between any two candidates is not admitted. The ranking expressed by any
single voter, thus, is simply a permutation of the set of candidates and the collection
of voters’ individual ranking gives rise to a voting situation. The latter is a description
of the number of voters who share a same ranking, for all possible rankings (or permu-
tations). Furthermore, each voter is supposed to cast her/his own vote in any possible
election. When A is the subset of candidates who actually participate in a specific elec-
tion, any voter will cast a vote for her/his preferred candidate within A, according to
her/his pre-established ranking. A preference pattern is a description of the voting re-
sults, corresponding to a voting situations, which could respectively be observed in all
the possible, matches between two different candidates. Such a voting context allows
for a clear explanation of the Condorcet’s paradox. In fact, the latter amounts to the
circumstance that some voting situation gives rise to non-transitive preference patterns
over candidates, even though transitivity has been assumed for the individual ranking
of each voter. In the description of this paradox, then, one only compares results of
elections involving pairs of candidates.
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One can however be interested in analyzing more detailed descriptions of the possible
consequences triggered by a voting situation. In fact, one can also focus attention on
the voting results that can be obtained in all the possible elections, also in the elections
involving whatever subsets of the whole set of candidates. The complete description of
all such results leads to the concept of ranking scheme, associated to a voting situation.
The concepts of voting situation, preference pattern, and ranking scheme are very well-
known in the frame of voting theory. See, in particular, exhaustive explanations and
references in the monographs [11], [19]. Related definitions will also be recalled in the
next section using a notation convenient for our purposes. The possibly paradoxical
aspects related with the analysis of a ranking scheme are those of the type originally
pointed out by Borda. A useful and informative special case in this direction is the one
designed by P. Fishburn (see in particular the discussion in [10] and [18]). On the other
hand, also the aggregation paradoxes mentioned in the item ii. above have similar forms.
Actually, for a given m-tuple of random variables, they are related to the behavior of the
family {αj(A);A ⊂ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ A}, and the latter also determines a precise ranking
scheme.
These topics are strictly related also to the classic stochastic game between two players,
who respectively bet on the occurrence of different events in a sequence of one-dependent
trials. The winner of the game is the one who first sees the occurrence of the event
on which she/he had bet. In fact, some paradoxical phenomena can emerge in such
a context as well. Relevant special cases are the possible paradoxes which are met
in the analysis of times of first occurrence for different words of fixed length in random
sampling of letters from an alphabet. See [13], [12], and also [7], [8]. This special field had
initially motivated our own interest toward these topics, toward the concept of stochastic
precedence, and toward the family of probabilities {αj(A);A ⊂ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ A}, more
in general. Special aspects of these topics have been analyzed in [6] and in [4], recently.
The occurrence times studied in the latter paper can be seen as first passage times of
suitable 1-dependent Markov chains, which makes the considered problems interesting
from a probabilistic viewpoint.
Concerning with the family {αj(A);A ⊂ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ A}, it will be pointed out
below (see Proposition 1 and Corollary 1) that the basic bricks to be used in the com-
putation of the αj(A)’s are the probabilities of the type
P
(
X1:m = Xπ(1), . . . , Xm:m = Xπ(m)
)
, (1)
where π ≡ (π(1), . . . , π(n)) denotes a permutation of the indexes 1, . . . , m andX1:m, . . . , Xm:m
denote the order statistics of (X1, . . . , Xm).
At the best of our knowledge, only at the end of the last century the phenomena,
respectively occurring in the analysis of ranking schemes for voting situations and for m-
tuples of random variables, have been formally studied in unified way. See in particular
the papers [16], [17] by Donald G. Saari, who developed a common approach for analyzing
and comparing the paradoxes respectively arising in the different levels i. and ii., and in
the two different contexts.
Saari proved that any ranking scheme can be actually observed, even when arbitrarily
paradoxical, provided that a suitable voting situation (or voting profile) is considered.
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Furthermore, and equivalently, the same result can be translated into the language re-
lated to comparisons among random variables, or lifetimes. The results in [16, 17] hinge
on refined algebraic and geometric tools.
As a main purpose of this paper we show how general results, leading to the same
consequences as the one by Saari, can be obtained by taking into account the mentioned
connection between voting theory and ranking of random variables and by exploiting
characteristic features of the load-sharing models. The method of proof resulting from
this approach is completely constructive and based on arguments of probabilistic char-
acter. Furthermore it is only based on detailed, and rather elementary, computations.
One difference between the result by Saari and our results (Theorem 2 and Corollary 1)
is in that the latter only deal with the construction of voting situations which generate
strict ranking schemes (see Definition 1). More general ranking schemes are on the
contrary considered in the former result where indifference is allowed, at a collective
level, between any two candidates. We preferred to consider a more restricted setting for
the sake of a better illustration of the basic ideas about the employment of load-sharing
models. However, at the cost of adding a further step to our proof, the same method
can also be used to obtain a stronger result whose implications on voting theory are
completely equivalent to those in [16], [17].
By means of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 we will show later on how our method can
provide a completely different type of proof for the classic theorem by McGarvey [15].
In fact, in the same direction of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, Theorem 3 and Corollary 3
will show how one can construct voting situations able to produce arbitrary preference
patterns, in place of ranking schemes.
In the literature devoted to voting theory, many papers really aim to obtain refined
results concerning the number of voters sufficient to produce a given voting situation.
Besides [15], [9], see in particular [27], [1], [25]. The interest in the present paper is
focused instead only on the conceptual possibility to construct voting situation and on
the related role of load-sharing models.
More precisely, the plan of the paper is as follows.
In Section 2 we point out preliminary results concerning relations between voting
theory and the study of the probabilities αj(A) for m-tuples of lifetimes. In particular
we introduce formalized notation, convenient to deal with the concepts of preference
pattern and ranking scheme in the present setting. Furthermore, the probabilities of the
type αj(A) are analyzed and their connections with probabilities of permutations as in
(1) and with ranking schemes are established. A couple of related examples is provided.
In Section 3, we recall the definition of load-sharing models, which are very special
cases of absolutely continuous multivariate distributions for (X1, . . . , Xm). In the ab-
solutely continuous case, a possible tool to describe a joint distribution is provided by
the set of the multivariate conditional hazard rate (m.c.h.r.) functions and load-sharing
models just arise by imposing a remarkably simple form to such functions. About the
latter functions, we will briefly provide definitions and some bibliographic references. We
will then give some definitions concerning time-homogeneous load-sharing models and
show a related property (see Proposition 1), useful in the present context.
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In Section 4 we formulate and prove our main result (Theorem 2) which shows, for
any strict ranking scheme σ(m), the existence of a probabilistic model for an m-tuple
(X1, . . . , Xm) which generates σ
(m). Such a model can be found within a special subclass
of time-homogeneous load-sharing models. Probabilistic aspects of this result will be
illustrated by means of some related comments and a pertinent example, whereas the
discussion of conceptual implications in the frame of voting theory will be deferred to
Section 5. We also point out (see Theorem 1) that any set of probabilities of permutations
as in (1) for an m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) is shared by a corresponding time-homogeneous
load-sharing model. Based on the preliminary results presented in Sections 2 and 3 and
on the main results of Section 4, Section 5 will be then devoted to the construction
of voting situations which give rise to pre-established preference patterns and ranking
schemes. On this purpose we analyze and discuss the effects, on some aspects of voting
theory, induced by the correspondence between minima among random variables and
ranking schemes. In particular, as mentioned, Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 show how the
classic result by McGarvey can be reobtained by means of Load-Sharing models. Finally,
a short discussion containing some concluding remarks will be presented in Section 6.
2. Notation and preliminary results
This section, devoted to formalizing necessary definitions and to presenting prelimi-
nary results, is divided into three separated subsections. For m-tuples of non-negative
random variables (X1, . . . , Xm), we analyze in the first subsection the probabilities
αj (A) defined in (4), the probabilities in (9) of the possible permutations triggered
by (X1, . . . , Xm), and corresponding relations among them. Next, after briefly recalling
some basic notions from voting theory, in Subsection 2.2 we formalize some definitions
suitably for our purposes and point out some related aspects. In particular we concen-
trate attention on a concept of ranking scheme. In Subsection 2.3 the arguments of the
two preceding subsections will be compared and combined. This will lead us to describe
the formal correspondence between the two contexts of voting theory and of minima
among random variables.
For m ∈ N, the symbol [m] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , m}. When m > 1, we denote
by Pˆ(m) the family of subsets of [m] having cardinality greater than one. Some further
notation, convenient for our purposes, will be gradually introduced below.
2.1. Minima among non-negative random variables. LetX1, . . . , Xm be non-negative
random variables defined on the same probability space and satisfying the no-tie condi-
tion, i.e.
P(X1 6= X2 6= . . . 6= Xm) = 1. (2)
We denote by X1:m, . . . , Xm:m their order statistics. The assumption of no-tie property
allow us to define the random indices J1, . . . , Jm through the following position
Jr = i⇔ Xi = Xr:m (3)
for any i, r ∈ [m]. Henceforth, X1, . . . , Xm will be often referred to as the lifetimes.
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For A ∈ Pˆ(m) we consider the probabilities αj(A), which we now define formally by
setting
αi(A) := P(Xi = min
j∈A
Xj), i ∈ A. (4)
When A = [m] one obviously has αi(A) = αi([m]) = P(J1 = i).
For A ∈ Pˆ(m) and k ∈ [m− |A|], denote by D(m,A, k) the set
{(i1, . . . , ik) : i1, . . . , ik ∈ [m] \ A and i1 6= i2 6= . . . 6= ik}. (5)
of ordered samples of size k from [m] \ A. Coherently with this notation, the symbol
Dm = D(m, ∅, m) will denote the set of all the permutations of the elements of [m].
Concerning the probabilities αi(A), with A ∈ Pˆ(m), the following claim will be useful
for our purposes below.
Proposition 1. Let X1, . . . , Xm be non-negative random variables satisfying the no-tie
condition. Let A ∈ Pˆ(m) and ℓ = |A|. Then for any i ∈ A one has
αi(A) = P(J1 = i)+
+
m−ℓ∑
k=1
∑
(i1,...,ik)∈D(m,A,k)
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik, Jk+1 = i). (6)
Proof. The claim can be easily checked by partitioning the event {Xi = minj∈AXj} as
follows.
{Xi = min
j∈A
Xj} = {J1 = i} ∪
(
m−ℓ⋃
k=1
{J1 6∈ A, J2 6∈ A, . . . , Jk 6∈ A, Jk+1 = i}
)
= (7)
{J1 = i} ∪

m−ℓ⋃
k=1
⋃
(i1,...,ik)∈D(n,A,k)
{J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik, Jk+1 = i}

 . (8)

We set, for k ∈ [m] and (j1, . . . , jk) ∈ D(m, ∅, k),
p
(m)
k (j1, . . . , jk) := P(J1 = j1, J2 = j2, . . . , Jk = jk). (9)
We notice that, for k < m, the probability p
(m)
k (j1, . . . , jk) depends on
(p(m)m (j1, . . . , jk, ik+1, . . . , im) : (ik+1, . . . , im) ∈ D(m, {j1, . . . , jk}, m− k)
through the formula
p
(m)
k (j1, . . . , jk) =
∑
(ik+1,...,im)∈D(m,{j1,...,jm},m−k)
p(m)m (j1, . . . , jk, ik+1, . . . , im). (10)
As a consequence of Proposition 1 we thus obtain
Corollary 1. The probabilities (αi(A) : A ∈ Pˆ(m), i ∈ A) are determined by the proba-
bilities (p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm).
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Suppose now that, for any given A ∈ Pˆ(m), a ranking is fixed among the elements of A.
In order to describe such a ranking operation we define the ranking functions σ(m)(A, ·)
as follows. A function σ(m)(A, ·) is a mapping from the elements of A to {1, 2, . . . , |A|}
with the property that its image is [w¯] = {1, , . . . , w¯} for some w¯ ≤ |A|.
For i, j ∈ A, we say that, according to the ranking function σ(m)(A, ·), i precedes j in
A if and only if σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j).
We admit the possibility that two elements are equivalent in A with respect to σ(m),
namely σ(m)(A, i) = σ(m)(A, j).
When we do not admit any possibility of equivalence between two elements we say
that σ(m)(A, ·) is a strict ranking function. Thus, a strict ranking function
σ(m)(A, ·) : A→ {1, 2, . . . , |A|} (11)
is a bijection between the set A and [ |A| ] = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}. Hence, σ(m)(A, ·) describes
a permutation of the elements of A.
Definition 1. For m ≥ 2, a ranking scheme over [m] is the family of the ranking
functions
σ(m) = (σ(m)(A, ·) : A ∈ Pˆ(m)). (12)
The collection of all the ranking schemes over [m] will be denoted by Σ(m). A ranking
scheme only composed with strict ranking functions is called a strict ranking scheme.
The collection of all the strict ranking schemes will be denoted by Σˆ(m) ⊂ Σ(m).
In terms of the probabilities (αi(A) : A ∈ Pˆ(m), i ∈ A) in (4) one can associate a
ranking scheme to the m-tuple X1, . . . , Xm, as formalized by the following definition.
Definition 2. We say that the ranking scheme σ(m) is p-concordant with the m-tuple
(X1, . . . , Xm) whenever, for any A ∈ Pˆ(m), and i, j ∈ A with i 6= j
σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j)⇔ αi(A) > αj(A), (13)
σ(m)(A, i) = σ(m)(A, j)⇔ αi(A) = αj(A). (14)
Example 1. For sake of brevity within this example we write p(·) in place of p(3)3 (·).
With m = 3, consider non-negative random variables X1, X2, X3 such that
p(1, 2, 3) =
2
18
, p(2, 1, 3) =
2
18
, p(3, 2, 1) =
5
18
,
p(3, 1, 2) =
3
18
, p(2, 3, 1) =
2
18
, p3(1, 3, 2) =
4
18
.
Thus we have
α1([3]) =
2
18
+
4
18
=
1
3
, α1({1, 2}) =
2
18
+
3
18
+
4
18
=
1
2
, α1({1, 3}) =
2
18
+
2
18
+
4
18
=
4
9
.
Similarly,
α2([3]) =
2
9
, α2({1, 2}) =
1
2
, α2({2, 3}) =
1
3
, α3([3]) =
4
9
, α3({1, 3}) =
5
9
, α3({2, 3}) =
2
3
.
Then, the ranking scheme σ(3), given below, is p-concordant with the triple (X1, X2, X3):
σ(3)([3] , 3) = 1, σ(3)([3] , 1) = 2, σ(3)([3] , 2) = 3,
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σ(3)({1, 2}, 1) = σ(3)({1, 2}, 2) = 1 (namely, 1, 2 are equivalent in {1, 2}),
σ(3)({1, 3}, 3) = 1, σ(3)({1, 3}, 1) = 2, σ(3)({2, 3}, 3) = 1, σ(3)({2, 3}, 3) = 2.
Remark 1. Of course, a same ranking scheme σ(m) can be p-concordant with several
different m-tuples of random variables.
A sufficient condition guaranteeing that a same ranking scheme is p-concordant with
two different m-tuples X1, . . . , Xm and X
′
1, . . . , X
′
m is, with obvious meaning of notation,
p(m)m (j1, . . . , jm) = p
′(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm), for any (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm.
Such condition is not necessary.
2.2. Voting theory. We now switch to the context of voting theory and we refer to the
language used e.g. in the monograph [11]. We denote by [m] a set of candidates and by
V(n) = {v1, . . . , vn} a set of voters.
We assume that the individual preferences of the voter vl, for l = 1, . . . , n, gives
rise to a linear preference ranking rl, which means that those preferences are complete,
transitive and indifference is not allowed between any two candidates. Thus rl is a strict
ranking function σ
(m)
l ([m], ·), namely any voter triggers a permutation over the set [m].
The matrix R(n) composed of all the rl’s represents the voter profile.
Each voter vi is supposed to cast her/his own vote in any possible election. When
A ∈ Pˆ(m) is the set of the candidates actually participating in a specific election, vl will
cast a vote for her/his preferred candidate within A, according to her/his established
linear preference ranking rl.
For h ∈ [m] and (j1, . . . , jh) ∈ D(m, ∅, h), we denote by N
(m)
h (j1, . . . , jh) the number
of all the voters who respectively rank the candidates j1, . . . , jh in the positions 1, . . . , h.
Namely, for those voters, j1, . . . , jh are the h most preferred candidates and
N
(m)
h (j1, . . . , jh) := |{i ∈ [n] : ri(jk) = k for any k ∈ [h]}|.
In particular, N
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) is the number of voters who share the same linear pref-
erence ranking. In the language of voting theory, the set of numbers
N (m) = (N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm)
is called voting situation. Notice that the number of voters is given by
n =
∑
(j1,...,jm)∈Dm
N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm). (15)
In an election where A ∈ Pˆ(m) is the set of candidates, ni(A) denotes the total number
of votes obtained by the candidate i ∈ A according to the afore-mentioned voting rule.
Thus
∑
i∈A ni(A) = n.
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Similarly to Proposition 1 we can claim that, for A ∈ Pˆ(m) and i ∈ A, the numbers
ni(A) are determined by the numbers N
(m)
h , for h ∈ [m− 1]. More precisely
ni(A) = N
(m)
1 (i) +
m−|A|∑
h=1
∑
(j1,...,jh)∈D(m,A,h)
N
(m)
h+1(j1, . . . , jh, i). (16)
On the other hand the numbers N
(m)
h can be obtained from the knowledge of the numbers
of the type N
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm). In fact
N
(m)
h (j1, . . . , jh) =
∑
(ih+1,...,im)∈D(m,{j1,...,jh},h)
N (m)m (j1, . . . , jh, ih+1, . . . , im). (17)
Therefore we see that the numbers ni(A) are determined by the numbers of the type
N
(m)
m . In other words, the voting situation determines the number of votes for the
candidate i ∈ A in an election limited to the members of A.
We see that the voting scenario described so far gives rise to a ranking scheme τ (m) ∈
Σ(m) in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 3. We say that a ranking scheme τ (m) ∈ Σ(m) is N -concordant with the
voting situation N (m) if, for any A ∈ Pˆ(m), and i, j ∈ A with i 6= j
ni(A) > nj(A)⇔ τ
(m)(A, i) < τ (m)(A, j), (18)
ni(A) = nj(A)⇔ τ
(m)(A, i) = τ (m)(A, j). (19)
A ranking scheme τ (m) ∈ Σ(m), N -concordant with a voting situation N (m), in par-
ticular indicates for any subset of candidates A ∈ Pˆ(m) the candidate who obtains the
plurality support.
2.3. Connections between voting theory and minima of random variables.
So far, we have been separately dealing with the two contexts of ranking non-negative
random variables and voting theory, respectively.
Along the above presentation, a number of analogies and of different features of simi-
larity have arisen at various levels. Notice in particular that formulas (16) and (17) are
the analogue of formulas (6) and (10). The following two propositions highlight that the
similarity existing between the two contexts is much more than an analogy. Actually,
they show how questions arising from voting theory can be analyzed from the viewpoint
of ranking lifetimes and pave the way for the results in the last section.
Lemma 1. Let N (m) = (N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm) be a voting situation and
let (X1, . . . , Xm) be such that
P(Xj1 < Xj2 < . . . < Xjm) = p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) =
N
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm)
K
, (20)
where K =
∑
(j1,...,jm)∈Dm
N
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm). Then a ranking scheme σ
(m) is p-concordant
with (X1, . . . , Xm) if and only if it is N-concordant with N (m).
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Proof. In view of Definition 2 and Definition 3 we must show that, for a set A ∈ Pˆ(m)
with i, j ∈ A,
αi(A) < αj(A)⇔ ni(A) < nj(A) (21)
and
αi(A) = αj(A)⇔ ni(A) = nj(A). (22)
By combining Proposition 1 with formula (10) and by plugging (20) into both equation
(16) and equation (17), one obtains
ni(A) = Kαi(A).
Whence (21) and (22) are immediately obtained. 
Let σ(m) ∈ Σ(m) be a given ranking scheme. As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, we
obtain an equivalence between the existence of N (m) and the existence of (X1, . . . , Xm),
such that σ(m) is, respectively, N -concordant withN (m) and p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm).
Proposition 2. The following claims are equivalent.
i. There exists a voting situation N (m) such that σ(m) is N-concordant with N (m).
ii. There exists am-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) such that σ
(m) is p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm)
and (p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm) are all rational numbers.
Proof. ii. ⇒ i. Let us consider a m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) such that σ
(m) is p-concordant
with (X1, . . . , Xm) and the associated quantities (p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm)
are all rational numbers. Thus there exists K ∈ N such that Kp(m)m (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ N, for
any (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm. Let us define
N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm) = Kp
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm), for all (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm.
Hence by Lemma 1, we obtain a voting situationN (m) = (N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm) : (j1, . . . , jm) ∈
Dm) such that σ(m) is N -concordant with N (m).
i. ⇒ ii. Starting from N (m) and σ(m) that is N -concordant with N (m), there are
several different methods to built a m-tuple X = (X1, . . . , Xm) for which σ
(m) is p-
concordant with X. A simple one goes as follows. We consider a discrete random
variable L uniformly distributed over [n]. From the population of all the voters we draw
the single voter vL, characterized by her/his linear preference ranking rL(·) = σ(m)([m], ·).
We define, for any i ∈ [m], Xi = rL(i). It is immediate to check that p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) =
N
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm)/n. By applying Lemma 1 we conclude the proof. 
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, we consider the voting situation N (3) obtained by
setting
N
(3)
3 (j1, j2, j3) = 18 · p(j1, j2, j3), for (j1, j2, j3) ∈ D3,
where the probabilities p(j1, j2, j3) are given in the previous example. By applying Lemma
1 we obtain, without performing any computation, that the ranking scheme σ(3), defined
in the previous example, is N-concordant with N (3).
In the next section attention will be concentrated to the case of absolutely continuous
joint probability distributions and, even more in particular, to the survival models of the
type Time-Homogeneous Load-Sharing.
RANKING SCHEMES THROUGH THE LOAD SHARING MODEL 11
3. Time-homogeneous Load-Sharing model
In this section attention will be limited to the case of lifetimes admitting an abso-
lutely continuous joint probability distribution. Such a joint distribution could then be
described by means of the corresponding joint density function. In such a case, however,
an alternative description can also be made in terms of the family of the Multivariate
Conditional Hazard Rate functions.
The two methods are in principle equivalent, from a purely analytical viewpoint.
However, they turn out to be respectively convenient to highlight different features of
stochastic dependence. As it will be seen below, the description of dependence in terms of
the Multivariate Conditional Hazard Rate functions is more convenient for our purposes.
This choice, in particular, leads us to single out Load-Sharing dependence models and
to appreciate their role in the present context.
Definition 4. Let X1, . . . , Xm be non-negative random variables with an absolutely
continuous joint probability distribution. For fixed k ∈ [m − 1], let (i1, . . . , ik, j) ∈
D(m, ∅, k + 1), and for an ordered sequence
0 < t1 < · · · < tk < t,
the multivariate conditional hazard rate function λj(t|i1, . . . , ik; t1, . . . , tk) is defined as
follows:
λj(t|i1, . . . , ik; t1, . . . , tk) := lim
∆t→0+
1
∆t
P(Xj ≤ t +∆t|Xi1 = t1, . . . , Xik = tk, Xk+1:m > t).
(23)
Furthermore, we put
λj(t|∅) := lim
∆t→0+
1
∆t
P(Xj ≤ t+∆t|X1:m > t). (24)
For remarks, details, and for general aspects see e.g. [22], [23], [26], the review paper
[24], and references cited therein.
For lifetimes X1, . . . , Xm, Load-Sharing is a very simple and natural condition of
stochastic dependence which is defined in terms of the m.c.h.r. functions and which
has a long history in the applied field of Reliability Theory. See e.g. the recent papers
[26], [6] for references and some more detailed discussions and demonstrations.
Such a class of multivariate probability distributions is defined by means of the condi-
tion that the m.c.h.r. functions λj(t|i1, . . . , ik; t1, . . . , tk) do not depend on the arguments
t1, . . . , tk. More precisely
Definition 5. The m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) is distributed according to a Load-Sharing
Model when, for k ∈ [m − 1], (i1, . . . , ik, j) ∈ D(m, ∅, k + 1), and for an ordered se-
quence 0 < t1 < · · · < tk < t, one has
λj(t|i1, . . . , ik; t1, . . . , tk) = µj(t|i1, . . . , ik),
for suitable functions µj(·|i1, . . . , ik).
12 EMILIO DE SANTIS AND FABIO SPIZZICHINO
A Load-Sharing Model is, furthermore, time-homogeneous when there exist non-negative
numbers µj(i1, . . . , ik) and µj(∅) such that, for any t ≥ 0,
µj(t|i1, . . . , ik) = µj(i1, . . . , ik), µj(t|∅) = µj(∅). (25)
For a fixed family M of the coefficients µj’s appearing in (25), define, for k ∈ [m− 1]
and (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ D(m, ∅, k),
M(i1, . . . , ik) :=
∑
j∈[m]:(i1,...,ik,j)∈D(m,∅,k+1)
µj(i1, . . . , ik) and M(∅) =
∑
j∈[m]
µj(∅). (26)
In the present context, a first reason of interest for time-homogeneous load-sharing
models is due to the simple form of the corresponding functions p
(m)
k (j1, . . . , jk). In fact
we have
Lemma 2. Let (X1, . . . , Xm) follow a THLS model with the family of coefficients M.
Let k ∈ [m] and let (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ D(m, ∅, k). Then
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik) =
µi1(∅)
M(∅)
µi2(i1)
M(i1)
µi3(i1, i2)
M(i1, i2)
. . .
µik(i1, i2, . . . ik−1)
M(i1, i2, . . . ik−1)
. (27)
Proof. See Proposition 2 in [26], see also [6]. 
We notice that, for fixed j ∈ [m], the functions µj(i1, . . . , ik) in (25) may in principle
depend on the order according to which i1, . . . , ik are listed. When this happen, we will
use the term time-homogeneous load-sharing models in a broad sense.
We will, on the contrary, use the term time-homogeneous load-sharing models in a
strict sense when µj(i1, . . . , ik) only depend on the set {i1, . . . , ik} and do not depend
on the order in which the elements i1, . . . , ik are listed. In this situation we put, for
(i1, . . . , ik, j) ∈ D(m, ∅, k + 1),
µˆj({i1, . . . , ik}) = µj(i1, . . . , ik). (28)
This notation will be occasionally used in what follows, when convenient on the purpose
of emphasizing that the argument in the function µˆ is a set rather than an ordered
sequence of indices. For fixed {i1, . . . , ik}, consider the set formed by all the values
µˆj({i1, . . . , ik}), j /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. Generally, for a THLS model in the strict sense, such a
set actually depends on {i1, . . . , ik}. In this respect, we also need the following definition
Definition 6. A time-homogeneous load-sharing model in a strict sense has the property
of Reallocation-Symmetry in Hazards if for any non empty set A ⊂ [m] the collection
of coefficients
{µˆj([m] \ A) : j ∈ A}
depends on A only through its cardinality |A|. Such models will be indicated by acronym
RSLS.
For RSLS models the condition
M(i1, . . . , ik) = M(1, 2, . . . , k) (29)
holds for any (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ D(m, ∅, k).
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The RSLS models, even if very special, have a fundamental role in our paper. This
will be attested by Theorem 2 that will be obtained in the next section.
4. Main result
The results in this section generally aim to demonstrate the role of load-sharing models
for the topics dealt with in this paper, as anticipated so far, and in Section 2 in particular.
It has also been pointed out therein that, for a vector of lifetimes (X1, . . . , Xm), prob-
abilities of permutations P (J1 = i1, . . . , Jm = ik) are the basic elements to determine the
p-concordant ranking scheme.
Consider now an arbitrary probability distribution ρ on the set of permutations Dm.
The forthcoming result aim to show that it there exists a load-sharing model such that
P (J1 = i1, . . . , Jm = im) = ρ(i1, . . . , im).
Next, we shall turn to facing the problem of main interest for this paper. Namely, we
shall show, in Theorem 2, that for any arbitrary strict ranking scheme σ(m), we can
suitably construct a load-sharing model able to produce the condition of p-concordance.
Theorem 1. For m ≥ 2 let the function ρ : Dm → [0, 1] satisfy the condition∑
(j1,...,jm)∈Dm
ρ(j1, . . . , jm) = 1.
Then there exists a family of coefficients
M = {µj(j1, . . . , jk) : k = 0, . . . , m− 1, (j1, . . . , jk) ∈ D(m, ∅, k), j 6∈ {j1, . . . , jk}}
such that the m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm), distributed according to a THLS model with param-
eters M, satisfies
P (J1 = i1, . . . , Jm = im) = ρ(i1, . . . , im).
Proof. For the fixed function ρ and for (j1, . . . , jk) ∈ D(m, ∅, k) we set
w(j1, . . . , jk) =
∑
(i1,...,im−k)∈D(m,{j1,...,jk},m−k)
ρ(j1, . . . , jk, i1, . . . , im−k). (30)
Fix now coefficients as follows
µj(∅) = w(j), µj2(j1) =
w(j1, j2)
w(j1)
, µj3(j1, j2) =
w(j1, j2, i3)
w(j1, j2)
, . . . ,
. . . , µjn−1(j1, j2, . . . , jn−2) =
w(j1, . . . , jn−1)
w(j1, . . . , jn−2)
.
In the previous formula we tacitly understand 0/0 = 0. By considering a THLS model
characterized by the coefficients above, the proof can now be concluded by applying
Lemma 2. 
The dependence model for (X1, . . . , Xm) occurring in the proof of the above result is
a broad-sense Load-Sharing model. It is, instead, sufficient to resort on the construction
of a RSLS model in order to state and to prove Theorem 2 below. See also Remark 2.
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Let σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) be an assigned strict ranking scheme. Starting from σ(m) we confine
our attention on a RSLS model parametrized by a finite collection of positive number
(ε(m)(u) ∈ (0, 1) : u = 2, . . . , m).
The values (ε(m)(k) : k = 2, . . . , m) will be suitably fixed along the proof of Theorem
2. The following condition is however required:
ε(m)(2) <
1
4
and 2(u− 1)ε(m)(u) < (u− 2)ε(m)(u− 1), for u = 2, . . . , m. (31)
Since here the value of m is fixed once for ever, in what follows we will simply write
ε(i) in place of ε(m)(i). We also set, for u = 2, . . . , m,
ρ(u) = ε(u)
(u− 1)
2
. (32)
Sometimes, the parametrization based on the ρ’s will be used in place of the one based
on the ε’s for the sake of obtaining more compact formulas. Written in terms of the ρ’s,
the condition in (31) becomes
ρ(2) <
1
8
and 2ρ(u) < ρ(u− 1), for u = 2, . . . , m. (33)
In what follows, we shall use several times a simple consequence of (33), namely
m∑
u=k
ρ(u) < 2ρ(k), (34)
where k = 2, . . . , m.
We now choose a special form for the coefficients of our RSLS model. For fixed
σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m), we denote by M(σ(m)) the collection of the coefficients as follows
µˆi([m] \ A) = 1− (σ
(m)(A, i)− 1)ε(|A|), A ∈ Pˆ(m), i ∈ A. (35)
For RSLS models M(i1, . . . , ik) do not depend on the indexes i1, . . . , ik (see Eq. (29)).
With the above choice and in view of (26) above we even obtain that, for k ∈ [m − 2],
M(i1, . . . , ik) does not depend on σ
(m). More precisely,
M(i1, . . . , ik) =
m−k∑
u=1
[1− (u− 1)ε(m− k)] = m− k−
(m− k)(m− k − 1)
2
ε(m− k) (36)
and
M(∅) =
m∑
u=1
[1− (u− 1)ε(m)] = m−
m(m− 1)
2
ε(m). (37)
We are ready to present some inequalities in the lemma below.
Lemma 3. Let m ≥ 2, σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) and let the m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) be distributed
according to a RSLS model with coefficients M(σ(m)) defined in (35). Then, for any
k ∈ [m],
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik) ≤
(m− k)!
m!
(
1 + 2
m∑
u=m−k+1
ρ(u)
)
(38)
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and
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik) ≥
(m− k)!
m!
(
1− 2
m∑
u=m−k+1
ρ(u)
)
. (39)
Proof. We start by proving the inequality (38). For k ∈ [m], by taking into account
formula (27), (35) and (32), we obtain the following upper bound
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik) =
=
µi1(∅)
m− m(m−1)
2
ε(m)
×
µi2(i1)
m− 1− (m−1)(m−2)
2
ε(m− 1)
×. . .×
µik(i1, i2, . . . ik−1)
m− k + 1− (m−k+1)(m−k)
2
ε(m− k + 1)
≤
≤
1
m− m(m−1)
2
ε(m)
×
1
m− 1− (m−1)(m−2)
2
ε(m− 1)
×. . .×
1
m− k + 1− (m−k+1)(m−k)
2
ε(m− k + 1)
=
=
1
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
×
1
1− ρ(m)
×
1
1− ρ(m− 1)
×. . .×
1
1− ρ(m− k + 1)
. (40)
By (34) one has
∑m
k=2 ρ(k) <
1
4
< 1
2
. Furthermore, for a ∈ (0, 1
2
), the inequality
1/(1− a) < 1 + 2a holds.
Hence, we can conclude that the quantity in (40) is less or equal than
1
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
×
1
1−
∑m
u=m−k+1 ρ(u)
≤
1 + 2
∑m
u=m−k+1 ρ(u)
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
=
=
(m− k)!
m!
(
1 + 2
m∑
u=m−k+1
ρ(u)
)
.
We now prove the inequality (39). By taking again into account formulas (27), (35)
and (32), we also can give the following lower bound
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik) ≥
µi1(∅)× µi2(i1)× · · · × µik(i1, i2, . . . im−1)
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
≥
≥
[1− (m− 1)ε(m)]× [1− (m− 2)ε(m− 1)]× · · · × [1− (m− k)ε(m− k + 1)]
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
≥
≥
1−
∑m
u=m−k+1(u− 1)ε(u)
m(m− 1) · · · (m− k + 1)
=
(m− k)!
m!
(
1− 2
m∑
u=m−k+1
ρ(u)
)
.

For an m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) distributed according to a THLS model with coefficients
M(σ(m)) defined in (35), the probabilities in (27) depend on the family M(σ(m)). Then
also the probabilities αi(A) in (6) are determined by σ
(m). We now aim to give the
probabilities αi(A) an expression convenient for what follows. We shall use the symbol
αi(A, σ
(m)) and, in order to apply Proposition 1, we introduce the following notation.
Fix A ∈ Pˆ(m), for i ∈ A and ℓ = |A| ≤ m− 1,
βi(A, σ
(m)) := P(J1 = i), if ℓ = m− 1,
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βi(A, σ
(m)) := P(J1 = i)+
m−ℓ−1∑
k=1
∑
(i1,...,ik)∈D(m,A,k)
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jk = ik, Jk+1 = i),
(41)
if 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ m− 2. Also
γi(A, σ
(m)) :=
∑
(i1,...,im−ℓ)∈D(m,A,m−ℓ)
P(J1 = i1, J2 = i2, . . . , Jn−ℓ = im−ℓ, Jm−ℓ+1 = i),
(42)
for any 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ m− 1.
In terms of this notation and recalling Proposition 1, we can now write
αi(A, σ
(m)) = βi(A, σ
(m)) + γi(A, σ
(m)), (43)
for A ∈ Pˆ(m) with |A| ≤ m− 1.
By recalling Lemma 2 and the position (35), we see that βi(A, σ
(m)) only depends on
{σ(m)(B, ·) : |B| ≥ ℓ}, (44)
and γi(A, σ
(m)) only depends on
{σ(m)(B, ·) : |B| ≥ ℓ− 1}. (45)
Consider now, for fixed A ∈ Pˆ(m) such that |A| = ℓ,
B(ℓ) := max{βi(A, σ
(m))− βj(A, σ
(m))}, (46)
where the maximum is computed with respect to all the strict ranking schemes σ(m) ∈
Σˆ(m). It follows that B(ℓ) only depends on the quantities in (44). Furthermore, such a
quantity has the same value for any pair of distinct elements i, j ∈ A and, also recalling
(35), it takes the same value B(ℓ) for all the subsets A with |A| = ℓ.
On the other hand, we also consider the quantities
C(ℓ) := min{γi(A, σ
(m))− γj(A, σ
(m))} > 0, (47)
where the minimum is computed over the family of all the strict ranking schemes σ(m) ∈
Σˆ(m) such that σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j). It follows that C(ℓ) only depends on the quantities
in (45). Again C(ℓ) only depends on the cardinality ℓ = |A|.
Lemma 4. For any m ≥ 3 and any σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) one has, for ℓ = 2, . . . , m− 1, that
B(ℓ) ≤ 8ℓε(ℓ+ 1) (48)
and
C(ℓ) ≥
(m− ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
2 ·m!
ε(ℓ). (49)
Proof. For A ∈ Pˆ(m) such that |A| = ℓ < m, one has
B(ℓ) = max
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
{βi(A, σ
(m))− βj(A, σ
(m))} ≤
≤ max
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
|p1(i)− p1(j)|+
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+
m−ℓ−1∑
k=1
∑
(i1,...,ik)∈D(m,A,k)
max
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
|pk+1(i1, . . . , ik, i)− pk+1(i1, . . . , ik, j)|. (50)
By (38) and (39)in Lemma 3, one has
max
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
|p1(i)− p1(j)| ≤
4ρ(m)
m
and
max
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
|pk+1(i1, . . . , ik, i)− pk+1(i1, . . . , ik, j)| ≤ 4
(m− k − 1)!
m!
m∑
u=m−k
ρ(u).
We can thus conclude by writing
B(ℓ) ≤
4ρ(m)
m
+ 4
m−ℓ−1∑
k=1
(m− k − 1)!|D(m,A, k)|
m!
m∑
u=m−k
ρ(u). (51)
For |A| = ℓ, notice that |D(m,A, k)| = (m−ℓ)!
(m−ℓ−k)!
< m!
(m−k)!
.
When |A| = ℓ, one obtains that the r.h.s. in inequality (51) is smaller than
4ρ(m) + 4
m−ℓ−1∑
k=1
n∑
u=m−k
ρ(u). (52)
By (34), the quantity in (52) is smaller than
4ρ(m) + 8
m−ℓ−1∑
k=1
ρ(m− k) ≤ 8
m−ℓ−1∑
k=0
ρ(m− k) ≤ 16ρ(ℓ+ 1).
In conclusion
B(ℓ) ≤ 16ρ(ℓ+ 1) = 8ℓε(ℓ+ 1).
We now prove the inequality (49), for any ℓ = 2, . . . , m− 1.
C(ℓ) ≥
∑
(i1,...,im−ℓ)∈D(m,A,m−ℓ)
min
σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) :
σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j)
{pm−ℓ+1(i1, . . . , im−ℓ, i)−pm−ℓ+1(i1, . . . , im−ℓ, j)}
(53)
≥
∑
(i1,...,im−ℓ)∈D(m,A,m−ℓ)
min
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
{pm−ℓ(i1, . . . , im−ℓ)}·
· min
σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) :
σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j)
{P(Jm−ℓ+1 = i|J1 = i1, . . . , Jm−ℓ = im−ℓ)−
− P(Jm−ℓ+1 = j|J1 = i1, . . . , Jm−ℓ = im−ℓ)}. (54)
By (39) in Lemma 3, one has
min
σ(m)∈Σˆ(m)
{pm−ℓ(i1, . . . , im−ℓ)} ≥
[
ℓ!
m!
(1− 2
m∑
u=ℓ+1
ρ(u))
]
. (55)
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Furthermore, see the proof of Lemma 2 and the identity (36), we have
min
{
P(Jm−ℓ+1 = i|J1 = i1, . . . , Jm−ℓ = im−ℓ)−
−P(Jm−ℓ+1 = j|J1 = i1, . . . , Jm−ℓ = im−ℓ) : σ
(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) with σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j)
}
=
=
1
ℓ− ℓ(ℓ−1)
2
ε(ℓ)
· min
σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) :
σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j)
{µi(i1, . . . , im−ℓ)− µj(i1, . . . , im−ℓ)} ≥
≥
1
ℓ− ℓ(ℓ−1)
2
ε(ℓ)
· ε(ℓ), (56)
where the last inequality follows by the position (35).
By combining (55) and (56), we obtain
C(ℓ) ≥
∑
(i1,...,im−ℓ)∈D(m,A,m−ℓ)
[
ℓ!
m!
(1− 2
m∑
u=ℓ+1
ρ(u))
]
1
ℓ− ℓ(ℓ−1)
2
ε(ℓ)
· ε(ℓ)
and then
C(ℓ) ≥ (m− ℓ)!
[
(ℓ− 1)!
m!
(1− 2
m∑
u=ℓ+1
ρ(u))
]
ε(ℓ) ≥
(m− ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
m!
(1− 4ρ(ℓ+ 1))ε(ℓ) ≥
≥
(m− ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
2 ·m!
ε(ℓ),
where we are exploiting inequality ρ(2) < 1
8
from (33). 
Let σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) be an arbitrary strict ranking scheme. We are now in a position
to prove that it is possible to suitably construct a load-sharing model for an m-tuple
(X1, . . . , Xm), such that σ
(m) is p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm).
Theorem 2. For any m ∈ N and for any strict ranking scheme σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) there exists
an m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) satisfying the following two conditions
i) (X1, . . . , Xm) is distributed according to a RSLS model;
ii) σ(m) is p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm).
Proof. We consider (X1, . . . , Xm) distributed according to the THLS model defined in
(35). We now show that, for a suitable choice of the parameters ε’s and for any strict
ranking scheme σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) one has, for any A ∈ Pˆ(m) and i, j ∈ A, the equivalence
αi(A, σ
(m)) > αj(A, σ
(m))⇔ σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j), (57)
i.e. σ(m) is p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm). In order to prove such an equivalence it
is enough, in view of the special choice in (35), to show that there exist ε(2), . . . , ε(m),
satisfying (31) and such that
αi([m], σ
(m)) > αj([m], σ
(m))⇔ σ(m)([m], i) < σ(m)([m], j), (58)
and
C(ℓ) > B(ℓ), for ℓ = 2, . . . , m− 1. (59)
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In fact, the relation (58) corresponds to (57) when A = [m]. Moreover, when |A| belongs
to {2, . . . , m− 1}, one has, under the condition σ(m)(A, i) < σ(m)(A, j),
0 < C(ℓ)− B(ℓ) ≤ αi(A)− αj(A).
Therefore (58) and (59) imply (57), namely σ(m) is p-concordant with X.
It remains to prove (58) and (59). By Lemma 2 and the choice (35), one has
αi([m]) = P(J1 = i) =
2− 2(σ(m)([m], i)− 1)ε(m)
2m−m(m− 1)ε(m)
,
then for any ε(m) ∈ (0, 1
m−1
) the equivalence in (58) holds true. Therefore, we can defer
to the end of the proof the suitable choice of the value of ε(m).
In view of the inequalities (49) and (48) in Lemma 4, one can obtain the inequalities
C(ℓ) > B(ℓ) for ℓ = 2, . . . , m− 1 by choosing ε(2), . . . , ε(m) in such a way that
(m− ℓ)!(ℓ− 1)!
2 ·m!
ε(ℓ) > 8ℓε(ℓ+ 1). (60)
This latter inequality can be obtained by simply letting
ε(ℓ) = (17 ·m ·m!)m−ℓε(m). (61)
In order to satisfy also condition (31), we set ε(m) = (17 · m · m!)−m+1. Thus, as a
consequence of the last choice and of the one in (61), it has be proven that (58) and (59)
hold true whence (57) holds as well. 
As a result of the arguments in the above proof one can conclude as follows:
Let σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) be a given strict ranking scheme, then it is p-concordant with an
m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) distributed according to a RSLS model with coefficients
µˆi([m] \ A) = 1− (σ
(m)(A, i)− 1)(17 ·m ·m!)1−|A|, i ∈ A, (62)
where A is a non-empty subset of [m].
Remark 2. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 respectively achieve two different goals. The
former aims to show that, for any arbitrary probability distribution ρ over the set of
permutations, one can construct a broad-sense load-sharing model such that the corre-
sponding vector (J1, . . . , Jn) is distributed according to ρ. This result shows the general
interest of load-sharing models, but it leaves unsolved the problem whether, for an arbi-
trary ranking scheme σ(m) ∈ Σ(m), it is possible to find a distribution ρ able to generate
σ(m). Such a problem is solved by Theorem 2 and the solution is obtained in terms of
RSLS models.
5. Ranking schemes and voting paradoxes
In this section we switch to applying the arguments of the previous section to the theme
of elections and voting paradoxes. Recalling the notation introduced in Subsection 2.2,
we think of a set of m voters and aim to the construction of a voting situation N (m)
able to generate a specific ranking scheme σ(m), N -concordant with N (m). The number
of voters associated to a voting situation is generally denote by the symbol n. Later on,
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we will also deal with the problem of constructing a voting situation able to generate a
specific preference pattern.
First of all we show that the following result can be obtained, as a direct consequence
of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. For any strict ranking scheme σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m), there exists a voting situation
N (m) with a number of voters n(m) only depending on m and such that σ(m) is N-
concordant with N (m).
Proof. Fix σ(m) ∈ Σˆ(m) and consider an m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) distributed according to
the THLS model with coefficients µˆi([m] \ A) as constructed by (35). Thus σ(m) is
p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm).
Recalling (35) and (61), the coefficients µˆi([m] \ A) are all rational numbers. For
any (j1, . . . , jm) ∈ Dm by Lemma 2 , the probabilities p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm) are all rational
numbers as well and will be denoted by p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm; σ
(m)) in order to emphasize their
dependence on σ(m). Thus one can find n ∈ N such that np(m)m (j1, . . . , jm; σ
(m)) are
natural numbers, irrespectively on σ(m). Consider now the voting situation N (m) defined
by
N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm; σ
(m)) = np(m)m (j1, . . . , jm; σ
(m)). (63)
By recalling (15), the total number of voters is given by
n =
∑
(j1,...,jm)∈Dm
np(m)m (j1, . . . , jm; σ
(m)).
The voting situation N (m) coincides with the one given in the proof of Proposition 2 and
thus σ(m) is N -concordant with N (m). 
Example 3. For m = 3 consider the strict ranking scheme σ(3) = σ defined as follows:
σ([3], 1) = 1, σ([3], 2) = 2, σ([3], 3) = 3,
σ({1, 2}, 1) = 2, σ({1, 2}, 2) = 1,
σ({1, 3}, 1) = 2, σ({1, 3}, 3) = 1,
σ({2, 3}, 2) = 2, σ({2, 3}, 3) = 1.
Namely, when the set of candidates is [3], 1 is the best candidate according to σ and 3
the worst one. At the same time, still according to σ, 3 is the best candidate and 1 is the
worst when they respectively participate in a direct match against a single opponent. By
applying Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 and by performing some manipulations we obtain
the voting situation:
N(1, 2, 3) = 2, N(1, 3, 2) = 15, N(2, 1, 3) = 1,
N(2, 3, 1) = 13, N(3, 1, 2) = 0, N(3, 2, 1) = 12.
The following procedure shows in details how to obtain the above voting situation. In view
of the positions in (35), the set of coefficients M is given by:
µ1(∅) = 1, µ2(∅) = 1− ε(3), µ3(∅) = 1− 2ε(3)
µ1({2}) = 1− ε(2), µ3({2}) = 1, µ2({1}) = 1− ε(2),
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µ3({1}) = 1, µ1({3}) = 1− ε(2), µ2({3}) = 1.
By the choices (61) and in the subsequent line one has ε(2) = 1
17×9×2
= 1
306
, ε(3) = ε(2)2 =
1
3062
. For brevity sake we set a = 1
306
. The corresponding function M is
M(∅) = 3(1− a2), M({1}) = M({2}) = M({3}) = 2− a.
By Lemma 2, concerning the probabilities of permutations, we obtain
p(1, 2, 3) =
1
3(1 + a)(2− a)
, p(1, 3, 2) =
1
3(1− a)2(2− a)
,
p(2, 1, 3) =
1− a
3(2− a)
, p(2, 3, 1) =
1
3(2− a)
,
p(3, 1, 2) =
1− 2a2
3(1 + a)(2− a)
, p(3, 2, 1) =
1− 2a2
3(1− a)2(2− a)
.
By multiplying all the probabilities p ’s by 3(1− a)2(2− a) we obtain polynomials of degrees
at most equal to three. Then we multiply by (306)3 in order to obtain a set of all natural
numbers Nˆ = (Nˆ(j1, j2, j3) : (j1, j2, j3) ∈ D3). In view of Lemma 1, the ranking scheme
σ is N -concordant with the voting situation Nˆ . From the voting situation Nˆwe pass now
to a different one by subtracting to all the elements Nˆ(j1, j2, j3) their minimum value. For
A ∈ P (3) and i, j ∈ A, this operation does not modify the differences ni(A) − nj(A) and
then the inequalities ni(A) < nj(A). A further useful operation on these numbers amounts
to dividing all of them by a same natural number H in such a way that the inequalities
⌊ni(A)/H⌋ < ⌊nj(A)/H⌋are maintained.
We notice that Theorem 2, and Corollary 2 with Example 3, focus attention to the
case of strict ranking schemes. However the logic of construction of voting situations and
of probabilities of permutations, as presented in the previous sections, can be usefully
applied to different cases of interest even for general ranking schemes.
In particular we can deal with the problem solved by McGarvey in the classical paper
[15], where the concept of preference pattern had been introduced. Here, we reformulate
such a concept coherently with the notation used in this paper. For any A ⊂ [m] with
|A| = 2, set
ξ(A, ·) : A→ {1, 2},
where
ξ({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ({i, j}, j) = 2 when iP j,
ξ({i, j}, j) = 1, ξ({i, j}, i) = 2 when jP i, (64)
ξ({i, j}, i) = ξ({i, j}, j) = 1 when iIj,
and where, as in [15], iP j means that i is preferred to j while iIj means that i and j
are equivalent.
One can now say that the collection of functions ξ(m) = (ξ(A, ·) : A ⊂ [m], |A| = 2)
is a preference scheme on the set [m]. Such a definition has then been given in a form
analogous to that of ranking scheme. Similarly, it is also natural to give related definitions
of p-concordance and N -concordance in the same line with Definition 2 and Definition
3.
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Definition 7. We say that the preference pattern ξ(m) is p-concordant with the m-tuple
(X1, . . . , Xm) whenever, for any i, j ∈ [m] with i 6= j and A = {i, j}
ξ(m)(A, i) < ξ(m)(A, j)⇔ αi(A) > αj(A), (65)
ξ(m)(A, i) = ξ(m)(A, j)⇔ αi(A) = αj(A). (66)
ξ(m) is N -concordant with the voting situation N (m) if for any i, j ∈ [m] with i 6= j and
A = {i, j}
ξ(m)(A, i) < ξ(m)(A, j)⇔ ni(A) > nj(A), (67)
ξ(m)(A, i) = ξ(m)(A, j)⇔ ni(A) = nj(A). (68)
By the use of Load-Sharing models we can easily construct probability distributions
that are compatible with any preference pattern.
Theorem 3. For any preference pattern ξ(m) there exists an m-tuple (X1, . . . , Xm) sat-
isfying the following two conditions
i) (X1, . . . , Xm) is distributed according to a strict sense time-homogeneous load-
sharing model;
ii) ξ(m) is p-concordant with (X1, . . . , Xm).
Proof. For brevity sake, along the proof we will write ξ in place of ξ(m). Let us define
the THLS model with coefficients given as follows. For B ⊂ [m],
µˆi(B) = 1, when |B| ≤ m− 3, or |B| = m− 1,
and, for B = [m] \ {i, j},
µˆi(B) = µˆj(B) = 1, when ξ({i, j}, i) = ξ({i, j}, j) = 1,
µˆi(B) = 2, µˆj(B) = 1, when ξ({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ({i, j}, j) = 2. (69)
Concerning the coefficients M(i1, . . . , ik) in (26) we obtain
M(∅) =
∑
j∈[m]
µˆj(∅) = m,
and for k ∈ [m− 3] and (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ D(m, ∅, k),
M(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑
j∈[m]:j 6=i1,...,ik
µˆj({i1, . . . , ik}) =
∑
j∈[m]:j 6=i1,...,ik
µj(i1, . . . , ik) = m− k.
We now turn to computing the value of M(i1, . . . , im−2), which depends on ξ.
For (i1, . . . , im−2, im−1, im) ∈ Dm
M(i1, . . . , im−2) =
∑
j∈[m]:j 6=i1,...,im−2
µj(i1, . . . , im−2) = µim−1(i1, . . . , im−2)+µim(i1, . . . , im−2) = 2,
if ξ({im−1, im}, im−1) = ξ({im−1, im}, im) = 1,
whereas
M(i1, . . . , im−2) =
∑
j∈[m]:j 6=i1,...,im−2
µj(i1, . . . , im−2) = µim−1(i1, . . . , im−2)+µim(i1, . . . , im−2) = 3,
if ξ({im−1, im}, im−1) 6= ξ({im−1, im}, im).
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Thus, for k ∈ [m− 2] and (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ D(m, ∅, k),
p
(m)
k (i1, . . . , ik) =
1
m(m− 1) . . . (m− k + 1)
.
For any A = {i, j} ⊂ [m] (|A| = 2) we need to compare the probabilities αi(A) and
αj(A). Thus, by (6),
αi(A) =
1
m
+
+
m−3∑
k=1
∑
(i1,...,ik)∈D(m,A,k)
1
m(m− 1) . . . (m− k)
+
∑
(i1,...,im−2)∈D(m,A,m−2)
p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, i).
(70)
One can see that the probability αi(A) depends on i only due to the rightmost sum in
formula (70). We also notice that,
p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, i) = p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, j) =
1
m · (m− 1) · . . . · 3 · 2
(71)
if ξ({i, j}, i) = ξ({i, j}, j) = 1.
On the other hand,
p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, i) =
2
3
1
m · (m− 1) · . . . · 3
, p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, j) =
1
3
1
m · (m− 1) · . . . · 3
(72)
if ξ({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ({i, j}, j) = 2.
By using the formulas (70), (71) and (72) we can now compare the probabilities αi(A)
and αj(A), for any A = {i, j} ⊂ [m].
By (70),(71) and recalling Definition 7, one has αi(A)−αj(A) = 0 when ξ({i, j}, i) =
ξ({i, j}, j) = 1.
Whereas, by (70) and (72)
αi(A)− αj(A) =
∑
(i1,...,im−2)∈D(m,A,m−2)
(
p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, i)− p
(m)
m−1(i1, . . . , im−2, j)
)
=
2
3m(m− 1)
> 0
if and only if ξ({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ({i, j}, j) = 2. This concludes the proof. 
From the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain the following conclusion concerning the con-
struction of voting situations for m candidates: for any given preference pattern ξ(m),
there exists a voting situation N (m) with n = 3m! voters such that ξ(m) is N -concordant
with N (m). More precisely, we have
Corollary 3. Given m candidates and any given preference pattern ξ(m), a voting situ-
ation N (m), such that ξ(m) is N-concordant with N (m), is given by
N (m)m (i1, . . . , im−2, i, j) = N
(m)
m (i1, . . . , im−2, j, i) = 3 (73)
if ξ(m)({i, j}, i) = ξ(m)({i, j}, j) = 1, whereas
N (m)m (i1, . . . , im−2, i, j) = 4, N
(m)
m (i1, . . . , im−2, j, i) = 2 (74)
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if ξ(m)({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ(m)({i, j}, j) = 2.
Proof. All the probabilities p
(m)
m (j1, . . . jm−1, jm) = p
(m)
m−1(j1, . . . , jm−1) with p
(m)
m−1(j1, . . . , jm−1)
appearing in (71) and (72) give respectively rise to integer numbers when multiplied by
3m!. By setting
N (m)m (j1, . . . , jm) = 3m!p
(m)
m (j1, . . . , jm),
we then obtain a voting situation. The latter coincides with N (m) and ξ(m) is N -
concordant with it. 
Besides the preference pattern ξ(m), we could also look at the ranking schemes pro-
duced by the THLS models in the proof of Theorem 3. We point out that a general
property valid for such a ranking scheme is
σ(m)(A, i) = 1, if |A| ≥ 3 and σ(4)(A, i) = ξ(4)(A, i), if |A| = 2. (75)
Namely, in any election all the participating candidates are equivalent except for the
matches between only two candidates.
We also notice that the previous construction of voting situations can lead to a number
of voters smaller than 3m!. These two aspects are illustrated by the following example,
motivated by the goal of constructing voting situations for cyclic preference patterns.
Example 4. We consider the following case with m = 4 where, in any match between
i, j ∈ [4], i is the winner against j if i < j with the exception for the pair 1, 4 in which
4 is the winner. Namely the preference pattern is as follows
ξ(4)({1, 4}, 1) = 2, ξ(4)({1, 4}, 4) = 1,
in all the other cases
ξ(4)({i, j}, i) = 1, ξ(4)({i, j}, j) = 2, for i < j.
The load sharing model considered in the proof of Theorem 3 is characterized by a set
of coefficients as follows
µi(A) = 1, for any |A| ≤ 1 and i 6∈ A,
µ1({2, 3}) = 1, µ4({2, 3}) = 2,
µi([m] \ {i, j}) = 2, µj([m] \ {i, j}) = 1,
when i, j ∈ [4] with i < j and (i, j) 6= (1, 4). By formula (72) one obtains that all the
probabilities of the permutations p
(4)
4 (j1, j2, j3, j4) are equal to the value 1/36 or to the
value 2/36. As a consequence, and by formula (70), one obtains that the probabilities
αi({i, j}) are equal to 17/36 or 19/36. More precisely αi({i, j}) = 19/36 if and only if
ξ(4)({i, j}, i) = 1.
A voting situation giving rise to such a cyclic preference pattern is obtained by setting
N (4)(j1, j2, j3, j4) = 36 · p
(4)
4 (j1, j2, j3, j4).
Hence 36 is a sufficient number of voters. The corresponding ranking scheme σ(4) has
the form
σ(4)(A, i) = 1, if |A| = 3 or |A| = 4 and σ(4)(A, i) = ξ(4)(A, i), if |A| = 2,
which in this special case is (75).
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Remark 3. Both Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are respectly based on the construction
of suitable RSLS and THLS models. Those models are used (in Corollary 2 and in
Corollary 3) to single out voting situations, respectively giving rise to assigned ranking
schemes and to assigned preference patterns. In this respect, the first type of voting
situation is more detailed in that it permits to specify assigned rankings over all the
subsets A ∈ Pˆ(m). On the other hand, Corollary 3 allows us to deal with assigned
preference patterns which also contain equivalent pairs of candidates.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
The main results in this paper (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) show how Time-Homogeneous
Load-Sharing models can be employed in the analysis of different types of ranking situ-
ations and, in particular, for applications in the field of voting theory (Corollary 2 and
Corollary 3). By exploiting strict connections between voting theory and the topic of
minima among random variables, we could hinge on the use of probabilistic tools, sub-
stantially elementary in nature, and aimed to develop a method directly related to the
conceptual aspects of problems under consideration. From an analytic viewpoint, the
specific role of THLS models can be explained as follows. First of all explicit formulas
can be given (Lemma 2) for the computation of probabilities of all the k-permutations
p
(m)
k (j1, . . . , jk) = P(J1 = j1, . . . , Jk = jk). Such formulas become even simpler in the
special case of RSLS models. Furthermore, for a given m-tuple (Y1, . . . , Ym) with any
type of joint distribution, one can construct a corresponding THLS model for an m-tuple
(X1, . . . , Xm), in such a way that the two m-tuples share the same set of probabilities
p
(m)
k (Theorem 1). From an heuristic point of view, an appropriate differentiation among
the coefficients µj(I), for given I and for different j /∈ I, dwells at the root of the con-
struction of suitable THLS models. More precisely, in the selection of such coefficients
it is convenient to reinforce (for i, j /∈ I, i 6= j) the difference between µi(I) and µj(I)
at the increase of the cardinality |I|. In the construction considered in Corollary 3, for
example, the coefficients µj(I)’s are even constant w.r.t. j, as far as |I| < m− 2.
The possibility to restrict attention on jointly absolutely continuous models permits
the use of m.c.h.r. functions in the description of stochastic dependence. In the ab-
solutely continuous case, such a type of description is in principle equivalent, but in a
sense it is alternative, to the more general one based on the concept of copula. Also
for what concerns the condition of stochastic precedence, and related aspects of intran-
sitivity, some studies have been based on the concept of copula (see in particular [3],
[5]). The analysis based on the m.c.h.r. functions of the same topics, as initiated in [6]
and developed here, may lead to useful comparisons and interactions between the two
methods.
Our results can also find an application to the field of system’s reliability, where
the definition of Load-Sharing models had originally arisen. In such a field, more and
more interest has been focused on the notion of signature of a system (see in particular
[20]). For a system with structure function φ and with m components having lifetimes
X1, ..., Xm, the signature is a probability distribution s over [m] which depends on φ,
and on the density function fX of (X1, ..., Xm). The dependence of s on fX is encoded
in the relative quality function q(A) = P(maxi/∈AXi < minj∈AXi) (A ⊂ [m]). See [14].
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Here we observe that the function q(·) is determined, on its turn, by the probabilities
p
(m)
m . Theorem 1 then also highlights the possible role of THLS models in the analysis
of the signature and of related concepts.
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